Insurance and Incentives for Medical Innovation by Alan M. Garber et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES










Prepared for RAND/NIH Workshop on the Economic Consequences of Medical Research, June 1, 2005,
RAND Corporation, Arlington, VA.  We are grateful to Dean Scrimgeour for excellent research assistance.
Garber’s research is supported in part by the Department of Veterans Affairs, the National Institute on Aging,
and an Investigators Award in Health Policy Research from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.  Jones
also thanks the Toulouse Network on Information Technology for research support.  The views expressed
herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic
Research.
©2006 by Alan M. Garber, Charles I. Jones and Paul M. Romer.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text,
not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including
© notice, is given to the source.Insurance and Incentives for Medical Innovation
Alan M. Garber, Charles I. Jones and Paul M. Romer
NBER Working Paper No. 12080
March 2006
JEL No. I1, O30
ABSTRACT
This paper studies the interactions between health insurance and the incentives for innovation.
Although  we  focus  on  pharmaceutical  innovation,  our  discussion  applies  to  other  industries
producing novel technologies for sale in markets with subsidized demand. Standard results in the
growth and productivity literatures suggest that firms in many industries may possess inadequate
incentives to innovate. Standard results in the health literature suggest that health insurance leads
to  the  overutilization  of  health  care.  Our  study  of  innovation  in  the  pharmaceutical  industry
emphasizes the interaction of these incentives. Because of the large subsidies to demand from health
insurance, limits on the lifetime of patents and possibly limits on monopoly pricing may be necessary
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being introduced. Innovation is associated with a fundamental nonconvexity
that renders infeasible the standard rst-best market equilibrium based on
price-taking competition. In the market that we consider here, the market for
pharmaceuticals, this nonconvexity is resolved by granting monopoly power
to the suppliers of new compounds.
It should come as no surprise that intuitions honed on rst-best analysis are
apoorguidetothewelfareanalysisofthismarket. Whenconsumerspurchase
pharmaceuticals, moral hazard  the insurance subsidy that enables patients
to pay only a fraction of the cost of pharmaceutical products they consume
(Pauly 1968)  creates a distortion that can improve welfare. Intuitively,
monopolymarkupsleadtosuboptimallylowconsumptionofpharmaceuticals,
while a coinsurance rate of less than 100% leads to excessive consumption.
Under some circumstances, these effects may offset one another. This point
is not new. A similar observation was made by Crew (1969) more than 35
years ago. Nevertheless, the difference between the welfare effect that insur-
ance subsidies have on spending for pharmaceuticals as opposed to spending
on other types of health services seems not to have received the attention
it deserves. Nor has the potential it creates for excessive innovation in the
pharmaceutical industry.
In this paper, we study the optimal provision of medical goods such as
pharmaceuticals. We break our analysis into two parts. We use the phrase
static efciency to characterize departures from the optimal utilization of a
drugthathasalreadybeendeveloped,anddynamicefciencytocharacterize
the degree to which innovators have the correct incentives to incur the xed
cost necessary to introduce a new compound.INSURANCE AND INCENTIVES FOR MEDICAL INNOVATION 3
We start with the ex post analysis of static efciency. After a pharmaceuti-
cal rm has introduced a new compound, we look for a coinsurance rate that
achieves efcient utilization of the drug. Next we observe that if the devel-
opment cost is known only to the rm, the rm will have the right ex ante
incentives to develop the drug if its anticipated prots equal the consumer
surplus the drug will generate.
In the full equilibrium that we describe, all consumers pay for a pharma-
ceutical insurance policy, and a sick consumer pays a low out-of-pocket cost
for the pharmaceutical. To facilitate the analysis and link it to data on the
incidence of a medical condition in the population, we specify a distribu-
tion that characterizes the various benets different people receive from the
pharmaceutical. For example, people with other risk factors for heart dis-
ease and higher initial levels of blood cholesterol may receive greater benets
from a cholesterol-reducing drug than consumers at lower risk. It is easiest
to interpret the demand function implied by this distribution function if we
assume that consumers make a zero-one decision about whether to take one
standardized course of treatment with the pharmaceutical, and we rely on this
simplifying assumption to describe our results. The results can, however,
readily be extended to the case where consumers also decide what quantity
of the drug to consume. Faced with this simple zero-one decision, consumers
purchase the drug if their out-of-pocket cost is less than or equal to the con-
sumer surplus they receive.
Because we specify the demand for the good in terms of a distribution
function for its benets, we can highlight a useful connection between the
hazard rate for consumer benets and the elasticity of demand for the good.
This allows us to link the hazard rate to the simple monopoly price that a
patent-owning rm would charge, and to characterize the prots the rm
receives relative to the consumer surplus it generates in terms of the behavior
of the hazard rate. In particular, consider the case where the coinsurance rate4 GARBER, JONES, AND ROMER
is set to achieve static efciency. In this case, as long as the hazard rate does
not fall too quickly (and certainly for a constant or increasing hazard), prots
will exceed consumer surplus. Dynamic efciency then requires a restriction
on monopoly power, such as nite patent life.
Theseresultsarenotmerecuriosities. Inmanyyears, pharmaceuticalshave
been the fastest-growing portion of health care expenditures, and accounted
for about 11.5% of U.S. health expenditures in 2005 according to Hefer,
Smith, Keehan, Borger, Clemens and Truffer (2005). In the rich countries of
the world, they are arguably the most important conduit for the practical ap-
plication of fundamental biomedical advances. The pharmaceutical industry
may also be a prototype industry for an economy that relies increasingly on
private rms to develop and put into use fundamental scientic and techno-
logical knowledge.
These results are also relevant to current policy debates. The movement
awayfromlowcoinsuranceratesandtowardsystemsinwhichconsumerspay
the full cost of a medical treatment (as embodied in the recently introduced
HealthSavingsAccounts)mightbewelfare-improvingfortraditionalservices
that are priced near marginal cost. It may, however, harm social welfare if
applied to purchases of new drugs.
Gaynor, Haas-Wilson and Vogt (2000), in an extension of the Crew (1969)
analysis, have shown that health insurance provided by a competitive market
can achieve static efciency when the copayment for each good or service
is set optimally. Taking the price of medical care as exogenous, they show
that price reductions, at least when price is above marginal cost, increase
welfare. Their analysis does not consider whether the resulting prots offer
appropriate rewards for innovation. Our analysis considers an alternative
benchmark where monopoly rms set medical prices given an exogenous
coinsurance rate. We study the optimal coinsurance rate and incentives for
innovation in this framework.INSURANCE AND INCENTIVES FOR MEDICAL INNOVATION 5
In a recent paper Lakdawalla and Sood (2005) consider dynamic efciency.
They view the health insurance contract as a two-part tariff and show that
efcient innovation may result. In particular, the health insurance premium
may extract expected consumer surplus from patients while the coinsurance
rate ensures optimal utilization. The innovator captures consumer surplus
through a competitive insurance industry that pays a two-part tariff to access
the innovation. This elegant result illustrates that efcient innovation may
result from nonlinear pricing arrangements. Our analysis complements this
approach by examining what happens to utilization and incentives to innovate
when monopoly innovators can only charge linear prices. We show that when
coinsurance rates ensure optimal utilization, incentives for innovation are
often excessive.
2. THE BASIC MODEL
The economy contains a collection of people indexed by i on the interval
[0;1]. A fraction of the population, s, becomes sick with an illness that can be
treated by the single pharmaceutical product that is the focus of the analysis
here. Everyone has the same ex ante risk of becoming ill. Those who become
sick suffer a loss of utility, denoted by i. For these individuals, utility takes
the form
U = u(ci)   i: (1)
The rst term in this expression is the utility from consuming standard goods.
The second term, i, represents the disutility the person suffers from being
sick.
The drug that can treat this condition does not produce the same expected
relief in every individual. We assume that consumers know this conditional
expected benet, which we denote by vi. If a sick consumer uses the phar-6 GARBER, JONES, AND ROMER
maceutical and consumes other goods at the level ci, her utility will be
U = u(ci)   i + vi:
For a curative treatment, i = vi, an exceptional circumstance that is not
required for the model. The fraction s also could equal 1, and vi could
exceed i (which can be zero). Thus the formulation is consistent with a
pharmaceutical that positively affects well-being in the absence of disease.
Therandomvariableviisdistributedamongthesickaccordingtoadistribution
function F(v).1 The utility loss term i is given exogenously for consumer i:
Becausethisdisutilitytermentersutilityinanadditivelyseparablefashion,we
canneglectitinanalyzingconsumeri'sdecisionsandincalculatingaggregate
welfare. This means, in particular, that the distribution of i does not affect
anything that follows.
As noted above, we assume for the sake of simplicity that consumers can
choosewhetherornottoreceiveacommon,singledoseofthedruginquestion.
To focus only on the risk associated with being sick (or more precisely, on the
risk that someone will have an opportunity to give up some income to benet
fromatreatment)andtosuppresstheriskthatindividualswillreceivedifferent
levels of income, we assume that all individuals have the same initial income
 y. (A more realistic but more complicated approach would be to assume that
income risk is not insurable.)
Our description of the supply side is as simple as possible. The pharma-
ceutical rm must incur a xed cost W to develop the drug. This cost will
matteronlywhenweconsidertheexanteanalysisofthedecisiontointroduce
the drug in Section 4 below. After developing the drug, the rm can produce
each additional dose at a constant cost of w per consumer.
2.1. The First Best
1Chang and Kim (2003) use a related approach to generate an aggregate labor supply curve
based on heterogeneous individual labor productivities.INSURANCE AND INCENTIVES FOR MEDICAL INNOVATION 7









~ c =  y   s(1   F(v))w: (3)




to the objective function. By integrating utility from standard goods over all
consumersweobtainthesingletermu(~ c). Becausepreferencesareadditively
separable, equating the marginal utility of consumption across consumers re-
quires that all people have the same consumption in the rst-best equilibrium.
With these simplications, social welfare equals the sum of utility from other
goods, plus the benets from treating people who have a benet level greater
than v, minus the neglected i terms.
The constraint in the optimization problem shows that ~ c equals per capita
income minus the cost of treating people who are sicker than a cutoff value
v. A fraction s of all individuals become sick. A fraction 1 F(v) of these
sick individuals will receive a benet from treatment that exceeds v. The
per-person cost of treatment is w.
The rst-order condition for this social optimization problem implies that
the optimal choice of the cutoff value v satises
v = u0(~ c)w: (4)
This has a natural interpretation in terms of benet and cost. The variable w
represents the cost in goods of an additional treatment. The expression on the8 GARBER, JONES, AND ROMER
right-handside, u0(~ c)w, representsthecostinforegoneutilityofanadditional
treatment. The rst-order condition says that the social planner should rst
allocatetreatmenttothepatientswhoreceivethegreatestbenetandcontinue
only until the marginal benet v equals the marginal cost.
3. EQUILIBRIUM WITH COINSURANCE PAYMENTS
If each consumer's benet vi were observable, there would be no prob-
lem implementing this rst best optimum. If the patient (and the patient's
doctor) can observe vi but the insurer cannot, it is impossible to support this
equilibrium. Any patient with vi > 0 will report a value greater than v:
Suppose therefore that the insurance contract pays a fraction 1    of the
cost of the drug when someone buys, leaving a required coinsurance payment
of p for the individual. For the moment, we assume the coinsurance rate  is
exogenously given. Later on, we will study the optimal setting of the coinsur-
ance rate (for example, by the government for publicly-provided health plans
or through regulation). If p is small relative to total income and consump-
tion, the loss in utility associated with the payment p will be small, and the
equilibrium with coinsurance payments will provide almost full insurance.
We assume that a single pharmaceutical rm has the exclusive right to pro-
duce the pharmaceutical that treats the condition in question. The monopolist
observes the total demand curve for the drug and selects the monopoly price
at which the drug is to be sold to consumers.
3.1. The Consumer's Problem
Each person who contracts the disease makes the following calculation. A
sick person has income y   y   (1   )px(p) + x(p)(p   w). The rst
term of this equation is the endowment,  y. The second term is the actuarially
fair insurance premium that covers the per person cost of insurance, where
p is the price of the drug and x is the total quantity demanded at that price.INSURANCE AND INCENTIVES FOR MEDICAL INNOVATION 9
Finally, we assume the drug companies are owned by the agents. The last
term is equal to each person's share of the ex post prots earned by the rm.
A patient will purchase the drug if
u(y   p) + vi  u(y):
Rewriting, person i purchases the drug whenever
vi  u(y)   u(y   p)  u0(c)p (5)
where c = y   p is the consumption of someone who purchases the drug.
This approximation is valid as long as p is small relative to y, which is
something that we will need to check in equilibrium. Note that p need not
be small when  is.
Let q denote the out-of-pocket payment that the consumer makes, q = p.
Then we can write the demand curve as
x(q) = s(1   F(u0(c)q)): (6)
Faced with a direct cost q, all sick people with a benet greater than the cutoff
value  v = u0(c)q purchase the drug.
3.2. The Monopoly Problem
We assume that the producer cannot engage in price discrimination. The
monopolistfacesastandardprotmaximizationproblemwithconstantmarginal
cost except that in this case, the monopolist receives payments from both the
consumer and the insurance company. When the consumer pays q; the mo-
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x0(q) + 1 = 0:













If we write this in terms of the payment p received by the monopolist, this





where  is evaluated at the price q = p paid by the consumer.
For the demand curve given above in equation (6), the derivative x0(q) can
be written as
x0(q) =  sF0(u0(c)q)u0(c):
The expression for  can then be written as
 = h( v)u0(c)p; (9)
where h(v)  F 0(v)=(1   F(v)) is the hazard rate corresponding to the
distribution F and  v  u0(c)p is the cutoff level for purchasing the drug.
(Henceforth, itwillbeeasiesttoworkwiththepricepthemonopolistreceives
rather than the price q the consumer pays.)
In our application, the hazard rate h(v) has the following interpretation.
Suppose we take the set of people whose health benet from treatment is at
least v and consider a small interval (v;v + ). The proportion of this groupINSURANCE AND INCENTIVES FOR MEDICAL INNOVATION 11
with a benet inside this small interval is equal to h(v): Roughly speaking,
as v increases, h(v) tells us the rate at which people drop out of the group
of people who have a value greater than or equal to v: (Using traditional
language, this group would be called survivors, but in our pharmaceutical
application, this term instead means the people gain a benet greater than the
level in question.)
The key result here is that the elasticity of demand for the drug is this
hazard rate, multiplied by the marginal utility of consumption and by the
out-of-pocket cost to the consumer.
Combining this expression for the demand elasticity with the monopoly
markupruleinequation(8)yieldsamorerevealingexpressionforthemonopoly
price received by the pharmaceutical manufacturer:




This is still an implicit equation for the solution since both  v and c depend
on the monopoly price. As we will see, it neverthess offers insight into the
pricing problem of the rm. Other things equal, the markup increases with
a decrease in the hazard rate, a decrease in ; and an increase in income that
lowers the marginal utility of consumption.





In this expression, x is the number of treatments sold, and the inverse of
h( v)u0(c) is the prot margin earned on each treatment.
3.3. Social Welfare and Consumer Surplus
AsshowninAppendixA,socialwelfareinthisequilibriumisapproximately






vF0(v)dv   u0( y)wx(p): (13)
The rst equation says that social welfare is the sum of two terms. The
rst u( y) is the utility consumers would receive from consuming all of their
income. The second term is a consumer surplus-like measure, CS. CS, in
turn, dependsontwoterms. Therstisthetotalutilitygaingeneratedbydrug
treatment, the sum of the vi's across all people. Subtracted from this is the
total cost of producing these treatments, wx(p), which is converted into its
utility equivalent by multipling by the marginal utility of consumption.
In this expression, we have neglected the loss in utility associated with the
incomplete insurance caused by the coinsurance payment p: This loss is
second order in p and for small value of p it can be neglected. We will
focus instead on two other losses. The rst is the static efciency loss that
arises when the price of the drug to the consumer is too high. The second is
the dynamic efciency loss that can arise when a drug with a value CS that is
greater than its development cost W is not introduced, and the mirror image
case, when a drug with a value CS that is less than W is introduced.
4. EFFICIENT UTILIZATION AND THE INCENTIVE TO
INNOVATE
In equation (4), we showed that the efcient utilization of the drug requires
all people with health benets vi  v  u0(~ c)w to receive treatment where
~ c is the common consumption level. In our equilibrium with coinsurance, the
treatmentcutoffvalueis  v  u0(c)pwherecistheconsumptionforsomeone
who is sick and makes the coinsurance payment.
First notice that ~ c, c, and y are related by
~ c =  y   wx(w):
y =  y   x(p)(p   w):INSURANCE AND INCENTIVES FOR MEDICAL INNOVATION 13
c = y   p:
In particular, as long as  y is sufciently large compared to p, we have
u0(~ c)  u0(y)  u0(c)  u0( y): (14)
(These approximations would also hold exactly if the utility function were
linear). Fromnowon, wemaketheassumptionthatthisapproximationholds,
so that the marginal utility of consumption is roughly the same whether one
buys the drug or not.
Under this assumption, efcient utilization of the drug requires
 v = v () p = w: (15)
That is, all people with health benets at least as large as v need to get the
drug. Thisrequirestheintuitiveconditionthatthepricefacedbytheconsumer,
p, be equal to the marginal cost of producing the drug, w. As long as this is
true, the economy can achieve full static efciency.
What about the incentives for the pharmaceutical company to introduce
the drug in the rst place? The pharmaceutical company will consider the
expectedpresentdiscountedvalueofprotsthatcanbeearnedwhendeciding
whethertodevelopandintroduceanewdrug. Fromthesocialwelfaremeasure
given above in equation (12), though, we saw that social welfare depends on
the consumer surplus-like measure, CS.
Ausefulmeasuretokeepinmindwhendiscussingtheincentivestoinnovate,





In this expression, we've divided CS by the marginal utility of consumption
to convert it from units of utility into units of consumption.
Graphically,Figure1showstheprotsandconsumersurplusforthespecial
caseinwhichtheutilizationofthedrugisefcient, i.e. whenp = w. Notice14 GARBER, JONES, AND ROMER






Profits,    p
Consumer Surplus,  CS(w)/u’(y)
x(w) s
that, in contrast to the standard monopoly case with no subsidy to demand,
theprotrectanglehereincludesaportionoutsidetheconsumersurplus. This
raises the possibility  which is conrmed in several examples below  that
the prots earned by the pharmaceutical company can exceed the consumer
surplus associated with the introduction of the drug treatment.
5. EXAMPLES
5.1. A First Example: the Pareto Distribution
As a simple illustrative example, suppose that treatment benets are dis-
tributed according to the Pareto distribution:





;  > 1; (17)
on the interval [v0;1). The Pareto distribution often appears as a good de-
scription of the upper tail of the income distribution, which has a thick tail.INSURANCE AND INCENTIVES FOR MEDICAL INNOVATION 15
To see what this means, suppose we consider that part of the population with
incomesgreaterthansomecutoffy. Nowaskwhatfractionofthisrichpopula-
tionhasincomesthat exceed y bymorethan 25%. FortheParetodistribution,
this fraction is invariant to the level of the cutoff y, whereas for distributions
withthinnertails, thefractiondeclinesastheincomecutoffrises. Saez(2001)
shows that this invariance accurately characterizes U.S. incomes in the early
1990s between $100,000 and $30 million. Assuming a Pareto distribution for
treatment benets, then, assumes that there is a long, thick tail of people with
very high benet levels.











The monopoly price increases with marginal cost and decreases in the elas-
ticity of demand.
Finally, the ratio of the monopoly prot to consumer surplus is given by2
() =
1
1 + ( 
 1   1)
: (20)
This formula shows that the ratio of prots to consumer surplus depends
on the product of the monopoly markup   =(   1) and the coinsurance






. Ifp < w bytoomuch, which
occurs at this point, then the consumer surplus shrinks to zero: the cost of producing the drug
exactly offsets the benet received.16 GARBER, JONES, AND ROMER
TABLE 1.
The Ratio of Prots to Consumer Surplus, Pareto Example
Markup Implied  The Coinsurance Rate  
  0.20 0.33 0.50 1.00
2 2.00 ... 3.00 1.00 0.33
3 1.50 2.50 1.00 0.57 0.25
5 1.25 1.00 0.55 0.35 0.17
10 1.11 0.47 0.28 0.18 0.09
Note: The table reports values of () computed according to equation (20). The markup 
is =(   1).
to consumer surplus, as the lower coinsurance rate increases the quantity of
drugs sold over which the monopolist earns a markup.
Table 1 shows some values of () for some parameter values. There
are two things to note about the table. First, the ratio of prots to consumer
surplusfallsasconsumersareforcedtopaytheentirepriceofthedrug. Italso
falls as the demand curve becomes less elastic (leading to a higher markup).
Second, in extreme cases in which the demand elasticity is relatively high
and the coinsurance rate is low, prots can exceed consumer surplus. In this
case, the increase in demand associated with the low coinsurance rate leads to
excess prots. The incentives for a pharmaceutical company to introduce a
new drug then exceed what is optimal. This case turns out to be more worthy
of consideration than one might have thought, as we will see again in the
examples that follow.
Finally,considerthecaseinwhichthecoinsurancerateischosentodeliver
the efcient utilization of the treatment. Recall that the condition for efcient
utilization is p = w, so that the rst-best level of utilization is achieved by
setting  =  1
 . In this case, () = 1. That is, the prots earned by the
monopolist are exactly equal to the consumer surplus.
So for a Pareto distribution of treatment benets, we have these striking
results. The government or a private insurer can achieve the rst best levelINSURANCE AND INCENTIVES FOR MEDICAL INNOVATION 17
of utilization of a drug by setting  =  1
 so that p = w: Consumers will
compare the marginal cost of the drug with its benets to them, leading to
efcient utilization. Moreover, if marginal cost is small compared to average
income,thelossesfromincompleteinsurancewillberelativelysmall. Finally,
in this equilibrium, a drug manufacturer with an innitely lived patent will
have the correct incentives to introduce a new drug. Prots earned equal
consumer surplus, both at a point in time and therefore in present discounted
value. If this present value exceeds the cost of introducing the drug, the rm
will introduce it. Otherwise, it will not.
5.2. A Second Example: the Exponential Distribution
Suppose now that the values for the treatment benet v have an exponential
distribution,
F(v) = 1   e v (21)
ontheinterval[0;1). Thedemandfunctioninthiscaseisalsoanexponential
function
x(p) = e u0( y)p:
This distribution has a constant hazard rate
h(v) = ;
so the monopoly price is an additive markup over marginal cost:




Notice that this expression implies that the treatment cutoff is bounded from
below:




This suggests an important difference between the exponential case and the
Pareto case. For the exponential distribution, the mean value of v is 1
: The18 GARBER, JONES, AND ROMER
payment(inutilityunits)thattheconsumermakeswillbelargerthanthemean
value of the benet from treatment, no matter how small  is. Reductions in
 induce offsetting increases in p. In the Pareto case, efciency required that
p be equal to marginal cost. If marginal cost is low compared to income,
then consumer payments will be also. Here, p is always greater than the
mean benet from treatment. This may be large compared to income, so the
assumption that p is small may not apply. The coinsurance payment may be
too large to achieve an adequate level of risk sharing.







2   (1   )u0( y)w
: (23)
At its upper bound  = 1, the incentive for innovation is too small by a
factor of 1=2. As  decreases, though, the ratio of prots to consumer surplus
increases. Asapproachesalowerlevel1  2
u0( y)w;theratiogoestoinnity
as net benets go to zero.
Toensurethatthetreatmentwillbeutilizedefciently, needstobechosen
so that p = w. Using the monopoly price from equation (22), this implies a
copayment of




At this rst-best level of treatment, the ratio of prots to consumer surplus is
() =
1
 > 1: (25)
That is, at the efcient level of treatment, the prots to the pharmaceutical
company exceed the consumer surplus, suggesting the possibility of an ex-
cessive incentive to innovate.
How is this possible? Recall that the monopolist is earning prots on every
treatment sold. Because of the monopoly markup, the efcient utilization ofINSURANCE AND INCENTIVES FOR MEDICAL INNOVATION 19
the drug requires a copayment rate that is less than one, and this subsidy leads
to a high level of demand and large prots, as shown in Figure 1 earlier.
What remedies are available in this case? Suppose the government sets an
upper bound on the price of the drug that is equal to m times w. Then a copay
 = 1
m will achieve efcient utilization of the drug, so  v will be equal to
u0( y)w. If m is large, the government will be able to achieve a high degree
of risk sharing through a low copay.
With a choice of  = 1
m,  will be equal to m, which may still induce
excessive efforts by rms to introduce new drugs. In this case, there may be a
case for a nite patent length and competitive production thereafter, with no
insurance coverage for off- patent drugs, which sell at marginal cost.
Society will receive the full present discounted value of the net benets







of consumer surplus in this case, it will clearly prefer this equilibrium with a
price ceiling to an unregulated equilibrium with an innitely lived patent and
no insurance. Of course, from a private point of view, the best outcome for
the rm would be to have insurance with a low coinsurance rate and no price
ceiling.
5.3. Linear Demand
Finally, suppose that the treatment benets are uniformly distributed on the
interval [0;]. Then the distribution function takes the form F(v) = v
 and20 GARBER, JONES, AND ROMER
the demand function is (approximately) given by




That is, the uniform distribution corresponds to the case of linear demand.
The hazard rate h(v) = 1











Once again, the payment in utility units u0( y)p that consumers make for the




For this distribution, the ratio of prots to our consumer surplus-like mea-





2(   wu0( y))
3   wu0( y)(4   )
: (26)
In the case of no coinsurance, where  = 1, this ratio is (1) = 2=3, so prot
falls short of consumer surplus, as one would expect.
What if  is set to deliver efcient utilization of the drug? Solving the
condition p = w for  yields




With this value for , the expression for  reduces to
() =
2u0( y)w
2u0( y)w   
> 1:
In the range of values for which marginal cost is less than the maximum
possible benet and in which it is possible to achieve optimal utilization of
the drug,
u0( y)w 2 (=2;):INSURANCE AND INCENTIVES FOR MEDICAL INNOVATION 21
Therefore the ratio of prots to consumer surplus varies between 2 and 1
when the treatment is efciently utilized.
As in the case of the exponential demand, the combination of an upper
bound on the price charged by the monopolist, together with a nite lived
patent, can nearly achieve the rst-best social optimum.
6. ROBUSTNESS OF THE RESULTS
The examples we provide in this paper illustrate that efcient utilization 
allocating the drug to those people who derive a benet at least as great as
marginal cost  does not inevitably lead to appropriate incentives to develop
the drug. In particular, the prots earned by the pharmaceutical company
setting a monopoly price can exceed the consumer surplus created by the
introduction of the drug, leading to a failure of dynamic efciency. The
subsidy to demand inherent in the low copayment leads to excess prots in




in excess of the consumer surplus for every distribution of treatment benets
F(v). To see this point, it is helpful to refer back to Figure 1. The monopoly
price p is determined by the local elasticity of demand at the point x(w). In
contrast, the consumer surplus depends on the shape of the demand function
at all prices above w. For the Pareto, exponential, and uniform distributions,
the local shape and the global shape of the demand function are connected in
such a way that ()  1.
For the Pareto distribution, the implied demand function exhibits constant
elasticity. The exponential and uniform distributions exhibit large demand
elasticities at high prices and are inelastic at low prices. Intuitively, this is
why prots can exceed consumer surplus: the monopoly price is based on22 GARBER, JONES, AND ROMER
the portion of the demand curve with a low price elasticity, generating high
prots.
This suggests that a demand curve that had the opposite shape  inelastic
at high prices and very elastic at low prices  would lead to prots less than
consumer surplus when the treatments are efciently utilized. Interestingly,
this is not what conventional distributions like those in our examples yield. In
those cases, the percentage change in demand associated with a one percent
decline in price is large when demand is low (i.e. at high prices) and small
when demand is high (at low prices).3
Appendix B shows how these results can be extended to more general
demand curves and more general underlying distributions. As long as the
elasticity of demand is a decreasing function of the price, static efciency is
associatedwithprotsthataretoolargerelativetoconsumersurplus. Interms
of the underlying distribution of benets from the innovation, this decreasing




the shape of the demand curve, which in turn reects the distribution of ben-
et, and which changes as substitutes and complements become available.
Static efciency may be achievable if the insurance market is competitive,
as Gaynor and colleagues have argued (Gaynor et al. 2000). They show that
marginalcostpricingleadstoawelfaregainovermonopolypricing,aslongas
copayments for each product or service are set optimally. Their purely static
analysisdoesnotconsiderincentivestoinnovateandotheraspectsofdynamic
3Still one can concoct a mechanical counterexample: consider the case where treatment
benets have a Pareto distribution for most people, but for some small fraction of people there
is a positive mass at a high benet level. This will not change the monopoly price or prots,
but it will increase consumer surplus. Since the straight Pareto case involved (
) = 1, this
richer example will deliver (
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efciency. Static efciency in our model also assumes that copayments are
set optimally for a price-taking insurer; the results would differ if, for exam-
ple, the insurer as well as the pharmaceutical company had substantial market
power. In that case, the copayment would be set at a level that takes into
account the price response of the monopolist pharmaceutical company.
It is unlikely that the insurance arrangements common today result in op-
timal copayments; there is typically a single copayment level for drugs in
government programs, and usually three tiers of copayments in commercial
health insurance plans. An insurer's response to the imposition of a high
price for a drug is usually to move the drug to a higher tier. Benet based
copayments are a proposed solution to better align cost sharing to benets,
and if successfully implemented might lead to utilization patterns closer to
theoptimum(Fendrick, Smith, ChernewandShah2001,Goldman, Joyceand
Karaca-Madic 2006, Rosen, Hamel, Weinstein, Cutler, Fendrick and Vijan
2005).
We have also assumed that the pharmaceutical producer cannot price dis-
criminate. Perfect price discrimination leads to an excess quantity of con-
sumption, rather than the competitive equilibrium, due to the insurance sub-
sidy. Furthermore, the monopolist gaining all of the surplus would receive
much larger prots than those considered in our examples. Thus, with price
discrimination, protsarelikelytoexceedconsumersurplusforabroadrange
of distributions of benet, leading to a failure of dynamic efciency. Shorter
patent life could offset the excessive rewards for innovation, though such








use, but it also helps avoid underuse.
However, with efcient utilization  static efciency  the prots earned
by the pharmaceutical company setting a monopoly price can exceed the
consumer surplus created by the introduction of the drug, leading to a failure
of dynamic efciency. The subsidy to demand inherent in the low copayment
leadstoexcessprotsinmanycases. Theresultingdynamicinefciencyraises
the possibility that nite patent lives could be welfare improving by reducing
excessive innovation. The examples also suggest that an upper bound on the
price received by the manufacturer may in some cases be required to ensure
that revenues are not too large in relation to the benets consumers receive.
In practical terms, these results imply that if price increases too rapidly as
the coinsurance rate declines, insurers may not be able to lower the out-of-
pocket costs sufciently to get high benet patients to consume the drug. For
some distributions of benet, it may also be very difcult to keep the high-
benet patients adequately insured without paying for the treatment of many
low-benet patients. Moreover, with low coinsurance rates, the incentives to
innovate can easily be too great, at least in the case of innite patent length.
Thus we expect that in the typical case, achieving both efcient utilization
and dynamic optimality requires a combination of a low coinsurance rate and
variation in patent duration.
In practice, however, simple use of either of these instruments may not
lead to optimality. For example, pricing should change as demand changes,
due perhaps to the entry of new competitors, and an administered price that
doesnotchangecorrectlycanleadtothewrongincentives. Similarly, optimal
patentdurationwouldvarywiththedrug,yetrulesthatpermitproduct-specic
patent life, and that preserve optimality properties in the presence of uncer-INSURANCE AND INCENTIVES FOR MEDICAL INNOVATION 25
tainty, would require fundamental changes in the law. In some extreme cases,
a very high upper bound on a drug's price  one that could be much higher
than the price a monopolist would charge in a market with a 100% coinsur-
ance rate  may help keep the price from growing without bound as the
coinsurance rate gets smaller.
Thegrowing,thoughstilllimited,useofconsumer-directedhealthplansand
health savings accounts is a sign of generally greater cost sharing. In such
plans, the coinsurance rate is 100% below a (high) deductible. Such plans are
likely to exacerbate the tendency to consume less than the optimal quantity
of monopoly-produced drugs, since price then equals marginal benet to the
patient, but exceeds marginal cost.
Unliketraditionalhealthinsuranceandhighcost-sharingplanslikeconsumer-
directedplans,managedcareseekstolimitquantitiesconsumedmoredirectly.
To the extent that such plans are successful, they steer allocation of drugs
toward patients who derive the greatest benet. Yet such plans are likely
to exacerbate the underconsumption of monopoly products, leading to both
static and dynamic inefciency.
Animportantavenueforfutureresearchistoexaminepricingstrategiesand
the incentives for innovation empirically. For example, Philipson and Jena
(2005) study the ratio of consumer surplus to prots in treating HIV/AIDS.




free to behave as monopolists who can choose a prot maximizing price to
charge consumers covered by health insurance. Prices may be constrained
by monopolistic competition between alternative treatments that are close
substitutes, an effect that is not captured in our simple one-good model. In
such a situation, each product might receive prots equal to the incremental26 GARBER, JONES, AND ROMER
surplus generated by the new product, even if the prots for all drugs in the
classarelessthantheconsumersurplusthatresultsfromtheavailabilityofthe
entireclassofdrugs. Inthiscase,asmallratioofprotstosurplusfortheclass
does not mean that the ratio will be small at the level of any single drug, and
it is not clear that the incentives to develop new drugs would be inadequate.
Alternatively, prots may be low relative to surplus in markets characterized
by signicant monopsony power, yielding insufcient incentives to innovate.
Empirical work should guide the development of more complete models of
the policies that some governments use to limit the prots of pharmaceutical
companies. Forexample,theremaybemerittoindustryclaimsthataggressive
government purchasing schemes pursued in the European Union may go too
farinthedirectionoflimitingtheprotsearnedonimportantnewdrugs. Such
claimswouldneedtobetestedempirically. Optimalpolicyrequiresbalancing
the possibility of prices that are too low to encourage innovation and prices
thataretoohigh. Wendthatintheabsenceofmonopsony,pricecontrols,and
other tools to limit demand, a system of medical insurance that relies on low
consumer coinsurance payments creates incentives for a monopoly provider
ofapharmaceuticaltochargefarmoreforitsproductthanitotherwisewould,
and possibly to receive excessive rewards for innovation.
APPENDIX A
Deriving Social Welfare in Equilibrium
To compute the value of social welfare, recall that x  x(p) denotes the
measureofpeoplewhopurchasethetreatmentinequilibrium. Then, ignoring
the exogenous i terms, social welfare (treating each person equally) is

(p) = (1   x)u(y) + xu(y   p) + s
Z 1
 v
vF0(v)dv:INSURANCE AND INCENTIVES FOR MEDICAL INNOVATION 27
Social welfare is the sum of three terms: utility from those who do not pur-
chase, consumption utility from those who do purchase the treatment, and the
treatment benet for these people, i.e. those with benets larger than  v.
Assumingpissmallrelativetoy, wecanusethesubstitutionu(y p) 
u(y)   u0(y)p to get





Next, recall that the relationship between equilibrium income y and the en-
dowment  y is
y =  y + x(p   w):
Thatis,incomeadjustsforthecopaymentandtheprotsofthedrugcompany.
Substituting this expression in for y we get









to consumer surplus generalizes to other distributions. Details of the proofs
are available from the authors.
Proposition B.1. Consider our model with demand x(q). Suppose this
demand function exhibits a price elasticity (q)   dx
dq
q
x that is weakly de-
creasing in the consumer price q. Then ()  1, with strict inequality if
(q) decreases strictly over some interval.
This proposition expresses a general result for the ratio of prots to con-
sumer surplus in terms of the elasticity of the demand function. In the text,28 GARBER, JONES, AND ROMER
we showed that the constant elasticity demand function leads prots to equal
consumer surplus when the treatment is utilized efciently, and gave two
examples (exponential and linear demand) when prots exceeded consumer
surplus. This proposition generalizes these examples by showing that if the
elasticity is decreasing, we get the result that prots will exceed consumer
surplus.1 In fact, this proposition generalizes to any demand function that lies
below an articial constant elasticity demand function, where the articial
constant elasticity is equal to the actual elasticity at the equilibrium price.
We can then extend this result for demand elasticities to the underlying
distribution that generates the demand function. The key is to note that, as
shown in equation (9), the elasticity of demand is
 = h(v)v:
A decreasing elasticity (as a function of price) ends up corresponding to a
hazard rate that falls no faster than 1=v. So as a direct corollary of our
proposition,ourmodeldelivers()  1aslongasthehazardrateh(v)falls
no faster than 1=v. Any underlying distribution with a constant or increasing
hazard, then, will generate the result that prots exceed consumer surplus
when utilization is efcient.
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